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Acronym List
• Bayesian Networks (Bayes Net)
• Bayesian Networks (BN)
• Command and Data Handling (CADH)
• Consultative Committee for Space Data 
Systems (CCSDS)
• Chemistry of Failure (COF)
• Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS)
• Displacement Damage Dose (DDD)
• Dead On Arrival (DOA)
• U.S. Department of Defense (DoD)
• Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM)
• Error Detection and Correction (EDAC)
• Electrical, Electronic and 
Electromechanical (EEE)
• Electrostatic Discharge (ESD)
• Geosynchronous Equatorial Orbit (GEO)
• Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC)
• Goal Structured Notation (GSN)
• International Space Station (ISS)
• NASA Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL)
• Low Earth Orbit (LEO)
• Model-Based Mission Assurance (MBMA)
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• Military/Aerospace (Mil/Aero)
• NASA Electronic Parts and Packaging 
(NEPP) Program
• Personal Computer (PC)
• Printed Circuit Boards (PCBs)
• Physics of Failure (PoF)
• real-time operating system (RTOS)
• Solar Anomalous Magnetospheric Particle 
Explorer (SAMPEX)
• Small Explorer Data System (SEDS)
• Single Event Effects (SEE)
• Single Event Upset (SEU)
• Small Explorer (SMEX)
• Surface Mount Technology (SMT)
• Static Random Access Memory (SRAM)
• Solid State Recorders (SSRs)
• Size, Weight, and Power (SwaP)
• Systems Modeling Language (SysML)
• Total Ionizing Dose (TID)
• Ultraviolet (UV)
• Virtual Real-Time Executive (VRTX)
Abstract/Outline
• NASA has a long history of using commercial grade 
electronics in space. In this talk, a brief history of 
NASA’s trends and approaches to commercial grade 
electronics focusing on processing and memory 
systems will be presented.
• This will include providing summary information on 
the space hazards to electronics as well as NASA 
mission trade space.
• We will also discuss developing recommendations for 
risk management approaches to Electrical, Electronic 
and Electromechanical (EEE) parts and reliability in 
space.
• The final portion of the talk will discuss emerging 
aerospace trends and the future for Commercial Off 
The Shelf (COTS) usage.
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Sample Space Hazards by Orbit Type
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GEO Yes No Severe Yes Yes No Yes No No No No 
LEO (low-
incl) 
No Yes Moderate No No No Not 
usual 
No No No No 
LEO Polar No Yes Moderate Yes Yes No Not 
usual 
No No No No 
Shuttle No Yes Moderate No No Yes Yes No Yes Rocket 
Motors 
No 
ISS No Yes Moderate Yes -
partial 
Minimal Yes Yes No No No No 
Interplanetary During 
phasing 
orbits; 
Possible 
Other 
Planet 
During 
phasing 
orbits; 
Possible 
Other 
Planet 
During 
phasing 
orbits; 
Possible 
Other 
Planet 
Yes Yes No Yes Maybe No Yes Maybe 
Exploration - 
Vehicles 
Phasing 
orbits 
During 
phasing 
orbits 
During 
phasing 
orbits 
Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Rocket 
Motors 
No 
Exploration – 
Lunar, Mars 
Phasing 
orbits 
During 
phasing 
orbits 
During 
phasing 
orbits 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Maybe No Yes  Yes 
 Note that this is not a complete space hazard list.
Other items such as operation in a vacuum, UV exposure, etc… aren’t included.
5The Space Radiation Environment
• Three portions of the natural 
space environment contribute 
to the radiation hazard
– Free-space particles
• Galactic Cosmic Rays 
(GCRs)
– Solar particles
• Protons and heavier ions
– Trapped particles (in 
magnetic fields )
• Protons and electrons 
including the earth’s 
South Atlantic Anomaly 
(SAA)
• Hazard experienced is a 
function of orbit and timeframe
Image from the OLTARIS Web site [Singleterry et al., 2010] 
maintained by the NASA Langley Research Center
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The Sun-Earth Radiation Environment
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Sun (left) acts as a source of protons (solar events) and its 
solar cycle (max, min) modulates the environment
Particles are trapped in the earth’s magnetic fields (right)
after K. Endo, Nikkei Sciences
7Space Radiation Effects
on Electronics
• Long-term cumulative 
degradation
– Ionization damage aka Total 
Ionizing Dose (TID)
– Non-Ionizing Damage aka 
Displacement Damage Dose 
(DDD)
• Single particle effects (aka 
Single Event Effects or 
SEE)
– Soft or hard errors caused by 
protons (mostly nuclear 
interactions) or heavy ions 
(direct energy deposition) 
Interaction with Nucleus
– Indirect Ionization
– Nucleus is Displaced
– Secondaries spallated
Particle interactions with semiconductors
Image from the Space Telescope Science Institute (STScI), operated for NASA by 
the Association of Universities for Research in Astronomy
http://www.stsci.edu/hst/nicmos/performance/anomalies/bigcr.html
Atomic Interactions
– Direct Ionization
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SEE Effects – Hard Failures During 
Particle Irradiation Testing
8
Failure images in a diode
Cross-section of failure location
High magnitude optical 
images of failure locations
Failure in a
Power Device
These types of failures are MISSION ending!
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Actual Space Anomalies Observed 
During Major Solar Event in 2003
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Type of Event Notes
Spontaneous Processor Resets in 
main computers
3 events; all recoverable
Spontaneous Processor Resets in 
main computers
Seen on other spacecraft; recoverable
Spontaneous Processor Resets in 
main computers
Spacecraft tumbled and required ground command to 
correct
High Bit Error Rates Communication link
Magnetic Torquers Disabled Guidance system
Star Tracker Errors Excessive event counts in guidance system
Star Tracker Errors Star Tracker Reset occurred
Read Errors Entered safe mode; recovered
Failure One mission failure noted
Memory Errors 19 errors on 10/29
Memory Errors Increase in correctable error rates on solid-state 
recorders noted in many spacecraft
Assurance for EEE Parts
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• Assurance is knowledge of
• The supply chain and manufacturer of the product 
• The manufacturing process and its controls
• The physics of failure (POF) and chemistry of failure 
(COF) related to the technology.
• Statistical process and inspection via
– Testing, inspection, physical analyses and modeling.
» Audits, process data analysis, electrostatic 
discharge (ESD), …
• Test/Qualification/Screening methods
– Understanding the application and 
environmental conditions for device usage.
• This includes:
– Radiation, Lifetime, Temperature, Vacuum, etc., as well as,
– Device application and appropriate derating criteria.
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Taking a Step Back…
11
Physics of 
failure (POF)
Chemistry of 
failure (COF)
Screening/
Qualification
Methods
Mission
Reliability/
Success
Application/
Environment
It’s not only about the technology,
but perspective on safe usage in space programs.
RISK MANAGEMENT!
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Reliability and Availability
• Reliability (Wikipedia)
– The ability of a system or component to perform its required 
functions under stated conditions for a specified period of 
time.
• Will it work for as long as you need?
• Availability (Wikipedia)
– The degree to which a system, subsystem, or equipment is in 
a specified operable and committable state at the start of a 
mission, when the mission is called for at an unknown, i.e., a 
random, time. Simply put, availability is the proportion of time 
a system is in a functioning condition. This is often described 
as a mission capable rate.
• Will it be available when you need it to work?
• Combining the two drives mission requirements:
– Will it work for as long as and when you need it to?
12
To be presented by Kenneth A. LaBel at SELSE 2018 14th IEEE Workshop on Silicon Errors in Logic System Effects, Boston, MA, April 3-4, 2018.
What does this mean for EEE parts?
• The more understanding you 
have of a device’s failure modes 
and causes, the higher the 
confidence level that it will 
perform under mission 
environments and lifetime
– High confidence = “it has to work”
• High confidence in both reliability 
and availability.
– Less confidence = “it may work”
• Less confidence in both reliability 
and availability.
• It may work, but prior to flight there 
is less certainty.
13
CONFIDENCE
LEVEL
– INDESTRUCTIBLE
– STURDY
– STABLE
– INCREASING
– FINE
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Traditional EEE Parts
Approach to Confidence
• Part level screening
– Electronic component screening uses environmental 
stressing and electrical testing to identify marginal and 
defective components within a procured lot of EEE parts.
• Part level qualification
– Qualification processes are designed to statistically 
understand/remove known reliability risks and uncover 
other unknown risks inherent in a part.
14
• Requires significant 
sample size and 
comprehensive suite of 
piecepart testing (insight) 
– high confidence
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EEE parts are available in “grades”
• Grades – Designed, certified, qualified, and/or 
tested for specific environmental characteristics.
– E.g., Operating temperature range, vacuum, radiation, 
exposure,…
• Examples: Aerospace, Military, Space Enhanced 
Product, Enhanced Product, Automotive, Medical, 
Extended-Temperature-Commercial, and 
Commercial.
– Aerospace Grade is the traditional choice for space usage, but 
has relatively few available parts and their performance lags 
behind commercial counterparts (speed, power).
• Designed and tested for radiation and reliability for space usage.
• NASA uses a wide range of EEE part grades 
depending on many factors (technical, 
programmatic, and risk).
15
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A History Lesson
16
Military and Aerospace share is estimated at ~$3.1B in 2015 (<1%)
Aerospace is a small percentage of this amount (<0.1%)
For comparison, in 1975, the Military and Aerospace market share was ~$50%!
Why NASA Has Used the Mil/Aero Grade
• Prime reason has been the detailed and relevant 
knowledge about the performance and reliability of 
the actual parts to be flown.
• Mil/Aero uses a standardized set of manufacturer 
qualification tests that provide confidence in a 
device’s reliability for a wide range of space 
conditions.
– The test levels are set such that they bound the majority of 
environment and lifetime exposures for space missions with the 
exception of extreme environments and, in some cases, radiation 
tolerance.
– Mil/Aero also allows manufacturers to perform one set of 
qualification tests rather than a tailored set for each specific 
mission environment and lifetime profile.
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Risk Avoidance Approach
NASA COTS Challenges
• Unique Space Usage Constraints
– Environment hazards
– Servicing (limited options)
– Wide range of mission lifetimes and orbits
– System availability (not just reliability) requirements (criticality of function and 
timing)
18
Used by permission from the author, Robert 
Baumann, "From COTS to Space - Grade 
Electronics: Improving Reliability for Harsh 
Environments," 2016 Single Event Effects (SEE) 
Symposium and the Military and Aerospace 
Programmable Logic Devices (MAPLD) 
Workshop, La Jolla, CA, May 23-26, 2016.
For a small market (compared to commercial),
space electronics place big demands on the semiconductor manufacturer.
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The Move to COTS in Space
• Up until 1990 timeframe, NASA used COTS mainly in cases 
where no Mil/Aero alternative existed or in some non-critical 
applications.
• However, key performance parameters (size, weight, and 
power – SwaP as well as processing system performance) 
began to drive the usage of COTS into mainstream 
applications within the Agency.
– Example: the evolution of space data recorders
• 1960’s-70’s - Magnetic Core Memory
• 1970’s-80’s - Magnetic Tape Recorder
• 1990’s - Solid State Recorders (SSRs) – Static Random Access Memory (SRAM)
• Late 1990’s - SSR – Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM)
• Early 2010’s - SSR – FLASH
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Apollo Guidance Computer
- 4 kB of Magnetic Core Memory
Courtesy NASA Archives
NASA’s Approach to
Using COTS Electronics – The “Old” Way
• The classic approach is called upscreening:
– Perform a series of tests over extended environment/lifetime 
parameters coupled with application usage information to 
determine if a part can meet a mission’s reliability/availability 
constraints.
– This includes temperature, vacuum, radiation, shock, vibration, 
etc…
• While the confidence in the reliability/availability of this 
approach may be less than electronics designed for the 
harsh space environment, sufficient risk reduction may 
be achieved.
– Starting around 1990, NASA missions that had multi-year 
operation or significant radiation requirements began coupling 
COTS parts into systems usually with a salient mix of Mil/Aero 
parts and fault tolerant architectures. 
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Example:
Solar Anomalous Magnetospheric Particle 
Explorer (SAMPEX)
• On November 13, 2012, the SAMPEX 
spacecraft reentered the earth’s 
atmosphere.*
• SAMPEX, the first of NASA’s Small Explorer 
(SMEX) spacecraft, was launched in 1992 
with a three year design lifetime (5 year 
goal).
• It lasted operationally nearly twenty years 
due to a myriad of testing, electronic parts 
selection, and system architecture, thrilling 
the scientific investigators who were able to 
obtain tremendous new scientific data.
• One should note that the entire spacecraft 
was designed, built, and validated in three 
years (1989-1992) by NASA.
– Its orbit was a slightly eccentric low earth polar orbit.
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* = Karen C. Fox, “NASA's SAMPEX Mission: A Space Weather Warrior,” NASA/GSFC, Nov. 01,2012, 
http://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/sunearth/news/sampex-deorbit.html
https://www.nasa.gov/images/content/700355main_
sampex_full.jpg
SAMPEX’s Command and Data Handling 
(CADH) System  -
The Small Explorer Data System (SEDS)
• SEDS was built upon traditionally competing 
ideas:
– Increasing spacecraft performance, and,
– Having a high reliability/availability spacecraft.
• This led, in itself, to two concepts for the CADH:
– Selection of commercial and new electronics 
technologies, and,
– Detailed evaluation (technology), qualification, and 
validation planning.
• The SEDS approach became the cornerstone 
philosophy and system design for generations of 
spacecraft that followed. 
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The SEDS Architecture
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STAR COUPLER
DPU
TLM A 
TLM B
GND CMDS
CTL/HK
ESN
8086
CLOCK / 1PPS
I/O
UP/DOWN
POWER
80386
PROCESSOR
MEM
MEM
MEM
MEM
PWR
ACE
PSE
PD/PCU
RPP
6 SLOT BOX CTT
4 SLOT BOX
TRANSPONDER
1PPS
64 BIT
SERIAL CMDS
DPU RESET
RS-449
1
7
7
3
B
A
C
K
P
L
A
N
E
RS-449
after  D. N. Baker, et al, “The Solar, 
Anomalous, and Magnetospheric 
Particle Explorer (SAMPEX) 
Mission,” IEEE Transactions on 
Geoscience and Remote Sensing, 
Vol. 31, No. 3, May 1993, pp. 531-541
SEDS Technology: Fiber Optics
• Development and first use of a 
fiber optic data bus (MIL-STD-
1773).
– This included selection and testing of the 
optical and electrical components, 
protocol electronics, connectors, 
couplers, and optical fiber.
– Radiation testing was partnered with U.S. 
Department of Defense (DoD) (Naval 
Research Labs) which has led to 
continued collaboration between our 
organizations. 
• MIL-STD-1773 was also the first 
NASA move away from traditional 
custom parallel bus structures for 
data/command transfer to serial 
bus structure.
– This simplified interconnects and was a 
size, weight, and power (SWAP) savings 
breakthrough.
– The underlying electrical protocol, MIL-
STD-1553, is still in common use across 
the space industry and paved the way for 
newer generations of databus
implementations such as SpaceWire.
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after  K.A. LaBel, et al, “SEDS MIL-STD-1773 Fiber Optic 
Data Bus: Proton Irradiation Test Results and Spaceflight 
SEU Data,” IEEE Transactions on Nuclear Science, Vol. 40, 
No. 6, Dec 1993
SEDS Technology: SSR
• First NASA use of COTS SRAM as 
means of building a SSR.
– A Hitachi 32k x8 SRAM device was used and 
tested by the Aerospace Corporation for 
radiation tolerance prior to insertion.
– The Air Force (P87-2 Mission) had flown this 
SSR design as an experiment previously.
– In addition, fault tolerance (Hamming Code 
Error Detection and Correction (EDAC)) was 
included to deal with the expected single event 
upset (SEU) radiation hits.
• The SSR was also the first use of 
surface mount technology (SMT) in a 
NASA spacecraft.
– SMT replaced through-hole mounting of 
devices to printed circuit boards (PCBs), thus 
allowing for two-sided PCB usage and more 
compact (physical) designs.
– A detailed series of thermal vacuum and 
shock/vibration testing was performed on test 
coupons to determine “safe usage” and rules 
were developed for the SAMPEX products and 
subsequently used by other NASA missions.
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P87-2 circa 1990
1st known spaceflight SSR
Air Force release pic from the P87-2 mission (aka Stacksat)
http://www.thespacereview.com/article/2104/1
after  C.M. Seidleck, et al, “Single Event Effect Flight Data 
Analysis of Multiple NASA Spacecraft and Experiments; 
Implications to Spacecraft Electrical Designs,” IEEE 
Proceedings of the Third European Conference on Radiation 
and its Effects on Components and Systems, 18-22 Sept. 1995
SEDS Technology:
COTS 32-bit Processor (1)
• The first use of a commercial 32-bit processor in 
a NASA spacecraft 
– INTEL 80386 and its peripheral support ICs.
• This drove development of a number of new 
features for space electronics:
– Extensive radiation test campaign by GSFC and JPL 
on the 80386 processor family at the part level. This 
drove initial designs for fault tolerance.
– A seven layer fault tolerant system that included:
• a watchdog processor,
• software task monitors,
• multi-day timeout, and more.
• Key Feature: the fault tolerance was based on dissimilar strings.
– A radiation hardened 80C86RH processor was used as a watchdog 
for the main processor
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SEDS Technology:
COTS 32-bit Processor (2)
• This drove a number of new features into and of 
itself (cont’d):
– A full system validation test under radiation exposure (i.e., 
an engineering model was taken to a heavy ion test facility 
along with the full ground system).
• Various chips were exposed sequentially.
• Upsets/anomalies were noted and the system would utilize its fault 
tolerant features to recover.
• A small number of unrecoverable events were noted and system 
workarounds were then designed in. This was teamwork at its best.
– First use of a commercial real-time operating system (RTOS): 
Ready Systems’ Virtual Real-Time Executive (VRTX) and the 
“C” programming language.
– Development and use of a deterministic software bus 
concept.
– First true implementation of the Consultative Committee for 
Space Data Systems (CCSDS) “Blue Book” by NASA.
27To be presented by Kenneth A. LaBel at SELSE 2018 14th IEEE Workshop on Silicon Errors in Logic System Effects, Boston, MA, April 3-4, 2018.
Changing Dynamics for Space
• Cost constraints and cost “effectiveness” have 
led to dramatic shifts away from traditional large-
scale missions (ex., Hubble Space Telescope) 
that utilize traditional assurance approaches.
• Two major trends in the aerospace community 
are driving the use of more non-space/radiation 
hardened products:
– The advent of small spacecraft such as CubeSats
• A different risk acceptance profile versus mission purpose 
and cost
– The increased use of “commercial” space providers
• The procuring agent “buys” a service or data product and 
the implementer is responsible for ensuring mission 
success with limited agency oversight
28To be presented by Kenneth A. LaBel at SELSE 2018 14th IEEE Workshop on Silicon Errors in Logic System Effects, Boston, MA, April 3-4, 2018.
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Michael Swartwout, "CubeSat Mission Success: 2017 Update (with a closer look at the effect of process management on outcome)," 
NASA Electronic Parts and Packaging (NEPP) Program, 2017 NEPP Electronics Technology Workshop, June 26-29, 2017.
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NASA Electronic Parts and Packaging (NEPP) Program, 2017 NEPP Electronics Technology Workshop, June 26-29, 2017.
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CubeSat Success?
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Michael Swartwout, "CubeSat Mission Success: 2017 Update (with a closer look at the effect of process management on outcome)," 
NASA Electronic Parts and Packaging (NEPP) Program, 2017 NEPP Electronics Technology Workshop, June 26-29, 2017.
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NASA’s Changing Landscape
• With NASA’s new era of commercial providers and small 
space missions (i.e. CubeSats, etc…) other approaches are 
being considered to find more cost-effective approaches to 
meeting mission requirements.
– These trends are driving the usage of non Mil/Aero parts such as 
Automotive grade.
• A few of the considerations for this emerging space 
include, but are not limited to:
– Increased reliance on fault tolerance, architectural reliability 
approaches, and even constellation spacecraft sparing,
– Leverage on the improved defect reliability of high yield COTS, 
automotive, industrial, and medical grades of electronics,
– Use of higher-assembly level testing,
– Reliance on new tools for model-based mission assurance (MBMA), 
circuit simulation and verification, as well as physics of failure (PoF), 
and,
– Improved communication on considerations, lessons learned and 
guidelines.
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The Modern Approach to EEE Parts
• The determination of acceptability for device 
usage is a complex trade space.
– Every engineer will “solve” a problem differently:
• Ex., software versus hardware solutions.
• The following chart illustrates an risk matrix 
approach for EEE parts based on:
– Environment exposure,
– Mission lifetime, and,
– Criticality of implemented function.
• Notes:
– “COTS” implies any grade that is not space qualified 
and radiation hardened.
– Level 1 and 2 refer to traditional space qualified EEE 
parts.
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Notional EEE Parts Selection Factors
High Level 1 or 2 
suggested. 
COTS upscreening/
testing 
recommended. 
Fault tolerant 
designs for COTS.
Level 1 or 2, rad hard 
suggested. 
Full upscreening for 
COTS. 
Fault tolerant designs 
for COTS.
Level 1 or 2, rad 
hard 
recommended. 
Full upscreening 
for COTS. 
Fault tolerant 
designs for COTS.
Medium COTS upscreening/
testing 
recommended.
Fault-tolerance 
suggested 
COTS upscreening/
testing recommended. 
Fault-tolerance 
recommended
Level 1 or 2, rad
hard suggested. 
Full upscreening 
for COTS. 
Fault tolerant 
designs for COTS.
Low COTS upscreening/
testing optional. 
Do no harm (to 
others)
COTS upscreening/
testing recommended.
Fault-tolerance 
suggested. 
Do no harm (to others)
Rad hard 
suggested. 
COTS upscreening/
testing 
recommended. 
Fault tolerance 
recommended
Low Medium High
34
C
rit
ic
al
ity
Environment/Lifetime
To be presented by Kenneth A. LaBel at SELSE 2018 14th IEEE Workshop on Silicon Errors in Logic System Effects, Boston, MA, April 3-4, 2018.
A Few Details on the “Matrix”
• When to test:
– “Optional”
• Implies that you might get away without this, but there’s residual risk.
– “Suggested”
• Implies that it is good idea to do this, and likely some risk if you don’t. 
– “Recommended”
• Implies that this really should be done or you’ll definitely have some 
risk.
– Where just the item is listed (like “full upscreening for COTS”) 
• This should be done to meet the criticality and environment/lifetime 
concerns.
• The higher the level of risk acceptance by a mission, the higher 
the consideration for performing alternate assembly level testing 
versus traditional part level.
• All fault tolerance must be validated.
35
Good mission planning identifies where on the matrix a EEE part lies.
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Model Based Mission Assurance (MBMA)-
A New Consideration for EEE Parts Assurance
36To be presented by Kenneth A. LaBel at SELSE 2018 14th IEEE Workshop on Silicon Errors in Logic System Effects, Boston, MA, April 3-4, 2018.
• Motivation
– Commercial parts (COTS)
– Document-centric work flow 
to model-based system 
engineering
– System mitigation (for COTS)
– Single source of system 
design parameters
https://modelbasedassurance.org/ 
Overview of Modeling Languages Used -
Model Based Systems Engineering (MBSE)
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Presented at NASA Electronic Parts and Packaging (NEPP) Technical Interchange Meeting (TIM), Vanderbilt University, Nashville, TN, August 29-30, 2017.
Lessons Learned on COTS for Space (1)
• In an ideal world (and given limitations of 
testability, time, and budget),
– Test at the device level to provide input for 
fault tolerant design. And,
– Test at the system level to validate design 
approaches
• Possibly uncover additional fault modes (statistics of 
test coverage).
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Many entities are trying to do the 2nd and mistakenly 
calling it qualification when it’s really a “system 
validation” (with some inherent risk)…
Lessons Learned on COTS for Space (2)
• Methods for evaluating risk in a more “system” 
manner are increasing based on risk profiles and 
architectures
– MBMA is one possible means for streamlining
• Understanding the criticality of the application is 
the key to performing adequate testing and 
validation for risk management
– However, even “good” ground testing and designs can 
be surprised (anomalies/failures)
• Example: The random/Markov nature of SEEs and 
challenges related to “completeness” of sufficient testing 
(time, resources)
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Summary
• An overview of NASA’s changing considerations 
for EEE Parts Assurance was presented
• This has included
– Background material on the challenge for COTS in 
space and traditional methodologies,
– Examples from the SAMPEX mission of COTS/new 
technology insertion,
– The changing space business,
– A discussion of a recommended assurance approach 
and new methods, and,
– A few lessons learned as takeaways.
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